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OBJECTION TO THE STATE'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant objects to the State's Statement of Facts and requests 
that the information contained therein be stricken as follows: 
1. Appellee's Statement of Facts does not comply with the 
requirements of Rule 24(a)(7) of the Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. Ut. R. App. P. 24(a)(7);(e) (West 2006). Five 
sentences1 in the State's Statement of Facts contain 
statements of facts that fail to cite the record below as 
required by that rule. Brief of Appellee, at 4. 
2. Contrary to Rule 24(e) of the Utah rule of Appellate 
Procedure, footnote three of the Appellee's brief contains a 
citation to a document not found in the record index 
prepared in accordance to Rule 11(b) of the Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. Brief of Appellee at 4, fn. 3; Ut. R. 
App. P. ll(b);24(e) (West 2006). 
3. Appellee sets forth in its Statement of Facts the following 
assertions of fact, that are not found in the record. 
a. The fourth sentence in the Statement of Facts asserts 
that Raymond Gerrish decided to go to Shawn Cloward's 
home. Id. Although the record indicates that Raymond 
Gerrish was at the home of Shawn Cloward, there is 
nothing in the record cited by the State that supports 
Sentences numbers 1,3,7,8, and 13 of the State's Statement 
of Facts, do not contain a record citation to support the facts 
contained therein. 
1 
this argument that it was Gerrish's decision to go to or 
to be present at the home of Shawn Cloward. R.73. 
b. The sixth sentence asserts that Raymond Gerrish trusted 
others who were on Shawn Cloward's property to act as 
lookouts. Brief of Appellee, at 3. There is nothing in 
the record to suggest that the "lookouts" that Officer 
Anderson refers to in his Search Warrant Affidavit, were 
present at the residence, were trusted by the defendant, 
that they were going to warn him, or that they had been 
assigned to lookout for the "wrong person". Id.; R.73.2 
c. Sentence number ten asserts that the confidential 
informant, referred to in the Search Warrant Affidavit, 
realized that Raymond Garrish was hiding from the 
police. Brief of Appellee, at 3. The record does not 
indicate how the informant obtained his information or 
what his subjective realizations were. R.73. 
d. Sentence number eleven of the Statement of Facts 
indicates that the confidential informant immediately 
contacted police. Brief of Appellee, at 3. The record 
indicates that the confidential informant saw Raymond 
2
 The State in its brief improperly uses a Cf. cite when 
citing to the record. Brief of Appellee at 3. The fact that 
there are people on the property of another acting as lookouts is 
not sufficiently analogous to assume that a person who is not the 
owner of the property trusts the lookouts; that the person has 
asked those people to lookout for him; or that they are reporting 
to the person what they see. The BLUEBOOK, a Uniform System of 
Citation, 23. (17th ed. 2000). 
2 
Gerrish at Shawn Cloward's home on the same day that the 
warrant was issued. R.73. However, there is nothing in 
the record that indicates how soon the confidential 
informant contacted the police after he saw Raymond 
Gerrish at the home of Shawn Cloward. Id.; R.73. 
e. Sentence number eleven asserts that when the 
confidential informant reported his information to the 
police, they immediately secured a search warrant for 
Shawn Cloward's home and property. Brief of Appellee, at 
3. The record indicates that the law enforcement 
officers requested a search warrant sometime during the 
same day that they received the information from the 
confidential informant. R.73. There is nothing in the 
record that indicates when the search warrant was 
secured. 
f. Sentence number fourteen asserts that for the 
concealment and the safety of the officers, judicial 
permission was given to search the property at night. 
Brief of Appellee, at 4. The Justice of the Peace who 
issued the search warrant does not indicate that the 
reasons for allowing a night search were for officers' 
safety. R.73. 
g. Sentence twenty-six asserts that Officer Wood suspected 
that the Defendant was Gerrish or Gerrish's accomplice. 
Brief of Appellee, at 5. Nothing in the record cited by 
3 
the State, supports this assertion. Id. Officer Wood 
did not testify that he suspected the Defendant was 
Gerrish. R.68:27-28,31. He testified that he didn't 
know, "what the situation was in the house/7 and that he 
didn't know the identity of the Defendant or the 
identity of Gerrish. Id. Officer Wood did not testify 
that he was concerned that the Defendant was an 
accomplice. Id. 
Sentence thirty-three asserts that Officer Wood asked 
the Defendant who he was because he suspected that the 
Defendant was an accomplice. Brief of Appellee at 5. 
Nothing in the record cited by the State, supports this 
assertion. Id.;R.68:27,31-32. Officer Wood did not 
testify that he suspected that the Defendant was the 
fugitive's accomplice. R.68:27. The officer only 
testified that he did not know "what the situation was 
inside the house." Id. He did not testify why he asked 
the Defendant for his name. R.68:31. 
Sentence forty-one asserts that when Officer Anderson 
entered the home of Shawn Cloward, that Sylvia Marquez 
was screaming and yelling. Brief of Appellee, at 6. 
The record cited by the State does not support this 
assertion. Id.; R.68:17,19-20. Officer Anderson does 
not indicate when Mrs. Marquez began yelling. R. 
4 
68:17,19-20. 
Sentence forty-three asserts that Officer Anderson 
ordered both Raymond Gerrish and his mother to the 
ground and that Mrs. Marquez did not comply with that 
order. Brief of Appellee, at 6. The record cite 
provided by the State does not support this assertion. 
Id.; R.68:19-20. Officer Anderson testified that he 
ordered Gerrish to get on the ground. R.68:19. Officer 
Anderson did not testify that he ordered both Raymond 
Marquez and his mother Silvia to get on the ground. Id. 
Sentence fifty-four asserts that upon entry into the 
home, a marijuana bong was in plain view. Brief of 
Appellee, at 7. The record cite provided by the State 
does not support this assertion. Id. The officers at 
the suppression hearing, and the officer who signed the 
second Search Warrant Affidavit, did not indicate that 




I. Defendant was not required to Marshal the evidence. 
The majority of the State's brief is spent arguing that the 
Defendant failed to adequately marshal the evidence. Brief of 
Appellee at 7-13,15. It argues, relying on State v. Brake, and 
Chen v. Stewart, that because a suppression hearing ruling is 
highly fact dependent, that the Defendant is required to marshal 
the evidence. Id. at 9. The State's reliance upon those cases is 
improper and outside the scope of law contemplated by those 
rulings. 
In Chen v. Stewart, the Utah Supreme Court granted the 
defendants' petition for relief from interlocutory orders that 
arose out of a lawsuit alleging corporate waste. Chen v. Stewart, 
100 P.3d 1177,1181 (Utah 2004). Chen involved twenty-seven 
individually named parties, ten unidentified John Doe defendants, 
and two-hundred pages of findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
Id. at 1177. Discussing the standard of review, the court held, 
"even where the defendants purport to challenge only the legal 
ruling, as here if a determination of the correctness of a 
court's application of a legal standard is extremely fact-
sensitive, the defendants also have a duty to marshal the 
evidence." Id. at 1184,1185. (Emphasis added). 
State v. Brake is a criminal case where the defendant 
challenged the rulings denying the suppression of evidence. State 
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v. Brake, 103 P.3d 699, 701 (Utah 2004), The court in Brake 
explained, "the legal analysis of search and seizure cases is 
highly fact dependent. We therefore begin with a full narration 
of the facts." Id. The legal differences between these two cases 
are numerous. One important distinction is the level of 
discretion the reviewing court gives to the trial court's 
different types of findings of fact. Chen, at 1184,fn 5. In a 
criminal case that involves a search and seizure challenge, a 
reviewing court gives little discretion to the trial court's 
findings of fact. State v. Warren, 78 P.3d 590 (Utah 2003). 
Whereas in cases like Chen, a broad amount of discretion is 
afforded the trial court's findings. Chen at 1184,fn 4. 
The State makes no attempt to justify the cross application 
of these two very different cases, areas of law, facts, and legal 
standards. Brief of Appellee at 8-13. Defendant objects to the 
State's argument and requests it be stricken from the State's 
brief. The requirement to marshal the evidence has never been 
demanded of a defendant challenging the legal conclusions of 
suppression ruling. 
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II. Officer Wood's search of the Defendant's body after he had 
been detained and handcuffed was unjustifiable. 
The State in its response cites no controlling precedent for 
its proposition that, when executing a search warrant, "'police 
may lawfully detain, handcuff, and question those found on the 
premises." Brief of Appellee at 13. Article I Section 14 of the 
Utah Constitution frequently affords more protections to its 
citizens than afforded under the U.S. Constitution. Am. Bush v. 
City of S. Salt Lake, 140 P.3d 1235, 1266 (Utah 2006); State v. 
Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 417-18, 420 (Utah 1991); U.S. 
Constitution. Amend. IV (West 2006); UT. Const, art. I § 14 (West 
2006) .3 
The crucial question upon which this appeal rests, is what 
level of suspicion a reasonable officer must have to first, 
detain and handcuff, and then second, search the body of a 
3
 Furthermore, the authority cited by the State is not 
relevant to the primary issue in this case. Summers and Muehler 
do not support the proposition that when executing a search 
warrant, in addition to cuffing, detaining, questioning, 
handcuffing, a compliant visitor's body may also be searched. 
Muehler v. Menaf 544 U.S. 93 (2005); Michigan v. Summers, 452 
U.S. 692 (1981). Allowing an officer to frisk as well as 
handcuff detain and question a visitor of a home for which a 
search warrant has been issued violates the protections described 
by Ybarra, and exceed the facts explained in Muehler and Summers. 
Yharra v. Illinios, AAA U.S. 85 (1979); Id. 
The State does not cite any controlling authority that 
supports its proposition that "the officer's subjective 
motivation is irrelevant." To the complete contrary the Utah 
Supreme Court recently re-affirmed its holding that an officer's 
subjective belief is a factor, to be considered in a reasonable 
suspicion analysis. State v. Alvarez, 2006 Utah 61, P15. 
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compliant visitor of a home that is being search pursuant to a 
warrant. First, Utah law allows law enforcement officers to 
temporarily detain and question those persons about whom there is 
a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. State v. Alverez, 
2006 Utah 61 P.14. That detention is limited in scope to the 
type of criminal activity and it must be brief and non-intrusive. 
Id. at P10. 
Second, Law enforcement officers are rightly allowed to, 
without a warrant, briefly search the bodies of those persons who 
they reasonably suspect pose a risk to their safety. State v. 
Warren, 78 P.3d 590 (Utah 2003). They are also allowed to search 
the body of a person when exigent circumstances permit that 
search. Alverez, at P21. 
In this case there are no facts which reasonably justify 
Officer Wood's search of the Defendant's person; this especially 
after he had already been detained and handcuffed. R. 68:26-31. 
The Defendant was completely compliant. R.68:23-29. He was lying 
face down on the floor with his hands handcuffed behind his back. 
R. 68:26. Officer Wood testified he did not see anything that 
caused him to feel concerned for officers safety. R.68:28. There 
were at least five officers in a home that contained four 
occupants. R.68:6,9-10,13. The subject of the warrant, Gerrish, 
was handcuffed, detained, and arrested, within the first twenty 
to thirty seconds of the officers' entry into the home. R.68:19-
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20. 
The State argues that a concern for the safety of the 
officers was justified by unidentified information of possible 
lookouts, the officers' failure to recognize Gerrish, their not 
knowing the situation inside the home before entering, the 
paraphernalia inside the home, and Silvia Marquez's hysterical 
conduct. Brief of Appellee at 13-18. Prior to and after entering 
the home there is no evidence in this case to suggest that the 
Defendant or the occupants of the home were dangerous, 
aggressive, or violent.4 There is nothing in the facts of this 
case to justify a reasonable concern for officers safety5 or 
exigent circumstances. 
Officer Wood's failure to recognize the Gerrish does not 
4
 The State in its response argues that Sylvia Marquez's 
emotional behavior, and her and her son's backpedaling at seeing 
the entry of at least five armed law enforcement officers force 
their way into the home justifies Officer Wood's search of 
Defendant's body. Brief of Appellee, at 11. The State's argument 
is simply not reasonable. Officer Anderson testified Mrs. 
Marquez was emotional and was yelling why are you here. R.68:19-
20. He also testified that she was in another room. 
He did not testify that she was behaving violently or that 
he thought she would. R.68:19-21. However even if she did, the 
State fails to explain why her behavior would justify a 
reasonable belief that the Defendant, who was handcuffed, lying 
face down on the floor, in another room, posed a reasonable risk 
to the officers. 
The fact that Gerrish and Sylvia Marquez began to backpedal, 
as the armed officers forced their entry without more does not 
justify the Defendant's search for officers safety. R.68:6-7, 26-
28. 
5
 Officer Wood testified the needle in the Defendant's 
pocket could have been used as a weapon. R.68:27,28. The needle 
was only found as a result of the illegal search. 
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justify a reasonable concern that the Defendant posed an officers 
safety risk. State v Warren, 37 P.3d 270, 273 (Utah Ct. App. 
2001). There is no evidence that Gerrish was violent. He was 
wanted for his failure to comply with his probation conditions 
and possession of a small amount of drugs. R.73. Neither of 
these crimes are inherently violent. Warren, at 273. Even if the 
Defendant had been Gerrish, a concern for officers safety without 
more, reliance upon his arrest warrant, would not have justified 
his search. 
The presence of drugs and drug paraphernalia throughout the 
home, absent the area of the home that Defendant occupied, does 
not justify a search of the defendant's person. Even if the 
drugs and paraphernalia which were in plain view were the 
Defendant's, possession of a small amount of drugs does not pose 
a risk to officer's safety. State v. Warren, at 270. More 
importantly the U.S. Supreme Court held in Ybarra, 
a person's mere propinquity to others independently 
suspected of criminal activity does not, without more 
give rise to ... search that person 
The initial frisk of Ybarra was simply not supported by 
a reasonable belief that he was armed and presently 
dangerous, a belief which this Court has invariably held 
must form the predicate to a patdown of a person for 
weapons. 
Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85,91,92,93 (1979). 
The facts in Ybarra are in many ways similar to the instant 
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case.6 Id. at 93. In this case as in Ybarra the Defenant was 
unjustifiably searched simply for the reason he was in present 
when a search warrant for the home he was visiting was executed. 
Id. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant respectfully requests that the Trial Court's denial of 
his motion to suppress be reversed. 
DATED this [) day of February, 2007. 
Samuel S. Bailey 
Attorney for the Defendant 
6
 The facts of Yabarra as described by the high court are as 
follows: 
When the police entered the Aurora Tap Tavern on March 1 
1976, the lighting was sufficient for them to observe the 
customers. Upon seeing Ybarra, they neither recognized 
him as a person with a criminal history nor had any 
particular reason to believe that he might be inclined to 
assault them. Moreover, as Police Agent Johnson later 
testified, Ybarra, whose hands were empty, gave no 
indication of possessing a weapon, made no gestures or 
other action indicative of an intent to commit an 
assault, and acted generally in a manner that was not 
threatening. . . . In short the State is unable to 
articulate any specific fact that would have justified a 
police officer at the scene in even suspecting that 
Ybarra was armed and dangerous. 
Ybarra at 93. 
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